

## Message Text

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11

ACTION PM-09

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ADP-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-02 INR-09 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12

NEA-10 GAC-01 MBFR-03 SAJ-01 IO-13 OIC-04 T-03 AEC-11

ACDA-19 OMB-01 RSR-01 /157 W  
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7052

INFO USMISSION BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1945

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 2561

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: FURTHER VIEWS OF SOVIET ACADEMICS.

HELSINKI FOR MPT DEL; VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

1. SUMMARY. AT NATO QUADRIPARTITE AND COUNSELORS MEETINGS MARCH 7, UK CHARGE AND COUNSELOR RESPECTIVELY BRIEFED COLLEAGUES ON HIGHLIGHTS OF RECENT VISIT TO ENGLAND OF DISARMAMENT SPECIALISTS KULISH AND KOSTKO FROM INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ( IMEMO). WHAT THEY HAD TO SAY ESSENTIALLY REPEATED VIEWS EXPRESSED ON EARLIER OCCASIONS TO THIS AND OTHER EMBASSIES. AMONG MORE STRIKING REMARKS WAS BELIEF THAT U. S. WOULD RETAIN FORCES ON EUROPEAN CONTINENT THROUGH THIS CENTURY-- WHICH IMPLIED CONVERSE, THAT SOVIET FORCES WOULD ALSO REMAIN IN  
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EASTERN EUROPE. UK SHARES OUR VIEW THAT ANALYSIS OF THESE ACADEMIC SPECIALISTS, WHILE SIGNIFICANT, MUST BE TREATED

WITH CAUTION AS ACCURATE INDICATOR OF SOVIET POLICY. END SUMMARY.

2. DISARMAMENT.

A. KOSTKO APPARENTLY DID MOST OF TALKING. ON GENERAL DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT, HE ARGUED THAT IT CANNOT BE APPROACHED FROM MILITARY ANGLE. ECHOING LINE USED IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR, HE SAID THAT DISARMAMENT MUST FOLLOW PRIOR POLITICAL DECISION AND WILLINGNESS TO DISARM, CREATING APPROPRIATE ATMOSPHERE.

ASKED ABOUT VERIFICATION WHICH HAS SO OFTEN PROVEN STUMBLING BLOCK IN DISARMAMENT TALKS, SOVIETS ARGUED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION ARE NOW SO GOOD AS TO RENDER ON- SITE INSPECTION SUPERFLUOUS. NUCLEAR INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS HAVE BECOME SO COMPLEX THAT INSPECTION OF THEM IS VIRTUALLY MEANINGLESS.

C. SOVIETS WERE VERY FRANK IN SAYING THAT SOVIET PHOBIA ABOUT SECRECY AND ESPIONAGE MAKE EVEN DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION VERY DIFFICULT. THE MOST THEY WERE PREPARED TO CONCEDE WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF " SOME MEASURE OF ON- SITE INSPECTION IN VERY EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES."

3. MBFR. SOVIETS ANALYZED MBFR BY ITS COMPONENT ELEMENTS:

A. MUTUAL: THERE MUST BE SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTIONS BY ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ( PRESUMABLY THOSE INVOLVED IN FORCE REDUCTIONS). REDUCTIONS BY US AND USSR ONLY WOULD BE INSUFFICIENT.

B. BALANCED: DIFFICULTY OF THIS CONCEPT BECOMES CLEAR WHEN ONE CONSIDERS QUESTION OF WHAT FORCES MAY BE INVOLVED.

C. FORCES: SOVIETS KNOW THAT NATO STRATEGY IS BASED ON ESCALATING DETERRENCE. IF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE THIS TAKING PLACE WITHOUT ESCALATION OF CONFLICT TO POINT WHERE FORCES OUTSIDE EUROPE WOULD BE USED ( E. G. POLARIS SUBMARINES IN PACIFIC, CONFIDENTIAL

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MEDITERRANEAN, U. S.- BASED FORCES, ETC.). ANY REDUCTION MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL FORCES WHICH COULD BE INVOLVED ANYWHERE. BY NOTING THAT SOVIETS WOULD NEED TO KEEP FORCES ON CHINESE BORDER REGARDLESS OF ANY CONFLICT WITH WEST, SOVIETS IMPLIED THAT REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE EXTENDED TO THESE FORCES. THEY CONCLUDED IT WAS UNREALISTIC TO LIMIT MBFR TALKS TO CENTRAL EUROPE.

D. REDUCTIONS: CLIMATE OF OPINION IN WEST IS NOT YET

RECEPTIVE TO REDUCING FORCES. ATMOSPHERE REMAINS ONE OF DISTRUST. SOVIET AIM IS TO REMOVE ALL FORCES IN EUROPE IN ORDER TO SAVE MONEY, RESOURCES AND MANPOWER. USSR ANTICIPATES, HOWEVER, THAT U. S. FORCES WILL REMAIN IN EUROPE IN VIABLE STRENGTH FOR FORESEEABLE FUTURE. AT LUNCHEON GIVEN BY SOVIET EMBASSY FOR KULISH AND KOSTKO AFTER THEIR RETURN, THEY COMMENTED THEY SAY AMERICAN FORCES REMAINING IN EUROPE UNTIL END OF CENTURY. THEY ALSO REMARKED THAT PRESENT BALANCE OF FORCES SEEMED AFTER ALL, SATISFACTORY TO ALL SIDES SO WHY TAMPER WITH IT.

E. CONFIDENCE- BUILDING MEASURES WERE DISCUSSED IN ENGLAND IN EQUALLY NEGATIVE TERMS. ONLY USEFUL MEASURE THEY COULD CITE WAS BAN ON MILITARISTIC PROPAGANDA. SOVIETS ASKED HOW IT WOULD PROMOTE SOVIET CONFIDENCE FOR THEM TO SEND OBSERVERS TO NATO MANEUVERS AND FIND THAT USSR IS THE HYPOTHETICAL ENEMY.

4. COMMENT: UK COUNSELOR VOICED CONCERN, WHICH WE SHARE, ABOUT READING TOO MUCH INTO VIEWS OF SOVIET ACADEMICIANS WHICH ARE NOT ALWAYS CONSISTENT WITH OFFICIAL SOVIET NEGOTIATING POSITION. WHEN ASKED EARLIER THIS YEAR ABOUT VIEWS OF KOSTKO, MFA OFFICIALS REACTED VERY MUCH AS DEPARTMENT OFFICERS MIGHT TO VIEWS OF AMERICAN ACADEMICIANS WITHOUT POLICY- MAKING RESPONSIBILITY, NOTING LIMITATIONS ON THEIR SOURCES.

5. ON QUESTION OF VERIFICATION, WE NOTE THAT ACADEMICIANS EVEN FROM SAME INSTITUTE TAKE RATHER DIFFERENT POSITION. IN ARTICLE PRINTED FOR USSR' S FRG MAGAZINE " SOVIET UNION HEUTE" ( BONN 1807) IMEMO SECTION CHIEF PROEKTOR REITERATED LINE HE USED IN HIS ARTICLE IN JUNE 1972 ISSUE OF INSTITUTE' S PUBLICATION IN WHICH HE SPOKE OF CREATION OF " FUTURE SYSTEM OF CONTROL OF DISARMAMENT" AND PICTURED ACTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS TAKING  
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PLACE " AFTER HAVING CREATED OPERATING SYSTEM OF GUARANTEE AND CONTROL." WHEN ASKED LAST SUMMER ABOUT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN HIS VIEWS ON VERIFICATION ISSUE AND THAT OF PROEKTOR, KOSTKO WAS OBVIOUSLY THROWN OFF STRIDE.

6. WE WOULD NOT SUGGEST ACADEMIC VIEWS ARE TO BE IGNORED, SIMPLY READ AGAINST BACKGROUND OF OTHER INFORMATION. THUS, KOSTKO SIGNALLED POSITION TAKEN BY SOVIETS AT VIENNA ON STRATEGIC RATHER THAN GEOGRAPHIC INTERPRETATION OF WHAT IS CENTRAL EUROPE. SINCE MANY DISARMAMENT ANALYSTS HAVE MILITARY BACKGROUND, IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE VIEWS REFLECT CONSERVATIVE MILITARY BIAS.

7. NATO COUNSELORS, NOTABLY FRG AND UK, FELT THAT VIEWS ABOUT U. S. FORCES REMAINING IN EUROPE MAY REFLECT TWO CONSIDERATIONS; ( A) SOVIET RELUCTANCE TO CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL

FROM EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH U. S. WITHDRAWAL WOULD ENCOURAGE, AND  
( B) PREFERENCE TO SEE U. S. WITHDRAWAL FROM WESTERN EUROPE  
SPREAD OUT OVER TIME LEST SUDDEN UNILATERAL ACTION TRAUMATIZE  
WEST EUROPEANS INTO MAKING MAJOR COMPENSATING DEFENSE EFFORT.  
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